Torts - Liability of Physician Erroneously Certifying Insanity by Rosenfeld, Richard Z.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 53 Issue 3 
1955 
Torts - Liability of Physician Erroneously Certifying Insanity 
Richard Z. Rosenfeld 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law and Psychology Commons, Medical Jurisprudence Commons, and the Torts 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard Z. Rosenfeld, Torts - Liability of Physician Erroneously Certifying Insanity, 53 MICH. L. REV. 493 
(2021). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol53/iss3/19 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
19551 RECENT DECISIONS 493
ToRTs-LIABiL TY oF PHYsicrm ERRoNEousLY CRTIFING INsArNTy-A
physician certified plaintiff to be insane, when in fact she was sane; she was
thereafter committed to a state sanitarium. Upon her release, she sued the
physician for negligence in examination. Defendant's demurrer for failure to
state a cause of action was sustained. On appeal, held, affirmed. Quoting
almost the entirety of an analogous 1900 decision from the same jurisdiction,'
the court held that defendant had owed no duty to plaintiff. Because the ad-
ministration of the law "should not be obstructed by the fears of physicians that
1Niven v. Boland, 177 Mass. 11, 58 N.E. 282 (1900).
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they may render themselves liable to suit,"2 certifying physicians "should be
exempt from liability."3 Furthermore, because commitment had been upon order
of a judge, defendant's negligence, if any, was not the proximate cause of plain-
tiffs confinement. Mezullo v. Maletz, (Mass. 1954) 118 N.E. (2d) 356.4
Physicians generally are required to exercise reasonable care in the practice
of their profession. 5 Elsewhere than Massachusetts, this liability has been ex-
tended to physicians certifying insanity." But since insanity is often hard to
determine with certainty, the Massachusetts court has desired to protect certify-
ing physicians from inquiry into their care whenever a dissatisfied patient is
released from an asylum. 7 Against this policy, however, must be weighed the
fact that plaintiff, improperly committed, is apparently to be afforded no redress
at law. Defining duty in another context, (then) Judge Cardozo said, "The risk
reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed."s The injury which
malpractice may cause would seem to require imposing a duty of care upon cer-
tifying physicians. 9 This would lessen the possibility of cursory examination
such as was apparently given here, and would reduce the likelihood of sane
persons being committed to an institution without chance of reparation. How-
ever, even if a court recognizes that policy dictates imposing a duty to exercise
care, liability must also be founded upon proximate causation of the confinement
by the negligent act. A few courts have said that when commitment is by
judicial order, "the certificates of all the doctors in the land would not of them-
selves have restrained her of her freedom in the least degree."' 0 But the doctrine
of proximate causation, in Massachusetts as elsewhere, would seem to be to the
2Id. at 14.
3 Ibid.
4 Plaintiff also alleged that defendant "maliciously" certified insanity when he "should
have known" her to be sane. This was held not to state a cause of action on libel, since
a certification of insanity in a judicial proceeding is privileged. See Perkins v. Mitchell,
31 Barb. (N.Y.) 461 (1860), and cases cited in 2 A.L.R. 1582 (1919). Nor did plaintiff
state a cause of action for false imprisonment, since "one who procures the arrest or con-
finement of another on lawful process is not liable to an action of false imprisonment,
although he caused the process to issue by means of false statements." Principal case at
359. Cf. Coupal v. Ward, 106 Mass. 289 (1871), and cases collected in 145 A.L.R. 711
(1943). Plaintiff alleged violation of a penal statute prohibiting conspiracy to commit a
sane person to an institution. This statute was held not to create a civil cause of action,
thereby effectively overruling Karjavainen v. Buswell, 289 Mass. 419, 194 N.E. 295 (1935).
For a holding that such conspiracy would afford a common law remedy, see Smith v.
Nippert, 76 Wis. 86, 44 N.W. 846 (1890).
5 DuBois v. Decker, 130 N.Y. 325, 29 N.E. 313 (1891).
6 Hall v. Semple, 3 F. & F. 337, 176 Eng. Rep. 151 (1862); Ayers v. Russell, 50 Hun
(N.Y.) 282, 3 N.Y.S. 338 (1888).
7 See Niven v. Boland, note 1 supra.
8 Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339 at 344, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
9 "Their duty must be measured . ..by the consequences flowing from its improper
performance." Ayers v. Russell, note 6 supra, at 289. Nevertheless, although broad enough
to suggest a duty in certification of insanity, Judge Cardozo's definition of duty is in fact
comparatively restrictive. Cf. Judge Andrews' broader definition, dissenting in the Palsgraf
case at 347. See too Heaven v. Pender, [1883] 11 Q.B.D. 503.
10 Force v. Probasco, 14 Vroom (43 NJ.L.) 539 at 541 (1881). This, however, was
an action for false imprisonment, not negligence. See also Niven v. Boland, note 1 supra.
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contrary. When the possibility of intervention by a third party, and consequent
injury to someone, is foreseeable and is enhanced by the negligent act, the
originally negligent party is not relieved of liability." If it is considered that
a certifying physician could reasonably have anticipated judicial commitment
in reliance upon his certification, the Massachusetts court has misstated the
applicable law of causation.'
2
Richard Z. Rosenfeld
11Scott v. Shepherd, 3 Wils. K.B. 403, 95 Eng. Rep. 1124 (1773); Lane v. Atlantic
Works, 111 Mass. 136 (1872); Beale, 'The Proximate Consequences of an Act," 33 HAnv.
L. RyEv. 633 at 650 (1920); PROSSER, TORTS 354 et seq. (1941), and cases there cited.
12 In Ayers v. Russell, note 6 supra, certifying physicians were held liable for negligence
despite the intervening act of judicial commitment, the court apparently considering a
discussion of causation unnecessary.
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